Abstract -This paper presents results on coevolving classes of strategies for the N-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD). We incorporate the notion of forgiveness in strategies and present experimental results which show that higher levels of cooperation and fitness are attainable when strategies are forgiving.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nplayer dilemmas are characterised as scenarios involving many participants such that the dominating option for each player results in a non Paretooptimal, outcome for all participants. The voter's paradox, volunteer's paradox and the collective action problem are examples of N-player dilemmas.
Real world examples include the well-known tragedy of the commons [I] , where a group of farmers prefer to allow their cattle graze on the common land rather than on their own land. However, if all farmers were to use the common ground, over-grazing would cause the commons to he destroyed for all. Another scenario, thepee-rider problem, was described by Glance and Huberman [Z] where a group of people are dining out with an agreement to split the bill. A temptation exists to order expensive options given that the extra cost will be bome by all. However, again, if all follow that line of reasoning, everyone ends up paying more than they had originally intended. Other well known scenarios include environmental issues, the voter's paradox, contributions to charities, membership of trade unions and return of tax contributions, Despite the many real world scenarios which exhibit the properties of N-player dilemmas, little attention has been paid to such dilemmas in In this paper we present a new family of strategies for playing the NIPD. These strategies incorporate the notion of /orgivewess where strategies behave cooperatively following a decrease in their pay-off due to increasing defection in the population. We encode a class of these strategies and examine the evolution of cooperation in a co-evolutionary setting. We compare the co-evolution of strategies which may forgive with the co-evolution of strategies that do not incorporate the notion of forgiveness.
In Section 2 we present related research. The design of the simulator used and the design of the family of forgiving strategies are discussed in Section 3. Experiments and results are presented in Section 4 and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
~L A T E D W O R K

A. N-player Social Dilemmas
We can represent, in an abstract manner, many of the N-player social dilemmas in the following manner:
players can cooperate or defect, i.e. can play a C or a D. a rule exists that awards a social benefit to all players, provided a sufficient number, T, of participants behave cooperatively (i.e. play a C ) . If less than T players play cooperatively, no reward is gained. In both cases, there is a cost for cooperators. We can extend this idea such that the benefit divided among the players is dependent on the number of cooperators. Boyd and Richerson [6] propose the following constraints to capture the dilemma:
i=l ... 
E. forgiving Strategies
Previous work has involved the investigation of forgiveness in strategies playing the 2-player game [8, 91. A shortcoming of reactive strategies like fitfar-tat [3] , is that they may react too quickly to defections and find themselves in a spiral of mutual defection which will be detrimental to the overall fitness of the strategy.
The forgiving strategy [8] 
, recognising a spiral of defection, attempt to forgive Given the above definition of a once-off N-player social dilemma, we can define strategies to play the repeated version. Many of the strategies designed for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma can be mapped and extended to the N-player IPD.
Boyd and Richerson [6] defme a family of strategies:
U: unconditionally defects,
To: cooperates if a cooperators cooperated on the previous round. Many approaches have been used to study this game. These include mathematical approaches (e.g. population dynamics), simulation (e.g. round robin), ecological simulations, evolutionary simulations, and co-evolutionary simulations. In the co-evolutionary model, strategies are evolved to play the game. The strategies are selected based on pay-offs received where the pay-off is dependent on the behaviour of other strategies (number of cooperators and defectors). Hence a changing landscape exists. This This approach has been investigated in static environments against a range of well-known strategies but moreover has been shown to be selected for in evolutionary settings whereby a range of behaviours were encoded in a genotype which was then subject to evolutionay pressures via a genetic algorithm wherein the scores achieved in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where taken as a measure of fitness.
DESIGN
In this section we present details of the strategies investigated and the methodology employed. We define two classes of strategies, the first class based on the work of Boyd and Richerson [6] and the second class extending previous work on the idea of forgiveness.
The first class of strategies can be represented as follows:
first move, threshold (the number of cooperators on the previous move required for the strategy to cooperate). We extend this class of strategies to incorporate the notion of forgiveness. In previous work in the 2-player game, we investigated strategies which would play cooperatively in order to break a spiral of mutual defection. We extend the idea to N-player games by allowing defecting strategies, who have noticed a decrease in their payoff (caused by increased defection in the population), to change their behaviour, for a period of time, to cooperation. In order to explore this we incorporate the following features:
first move, threshold (as before, the number of cooperators on the previous move required for the strategy to cooperate), forgiving? (a Boolean indicating whether the strategy will forgive or not), number of forgiving gestures per game (the number of times that a strategy will forgive during a game), length of cooperative gesture (the number of successive cooperations played by the strategy as a forgiving gesture), payoff-decrease? (a Boolean indicating whether the strategy's payoff has decreased from the payoff obtained I moves earlier to the payoff obtained on the previous move). In order to illustrate the behaviour offorgiving strategies in comparison to non-forgiving strategies, we include the following example. Table 1 displays the values for the features of first move and threshold value for six non-forgiving strategies. Table 2 EEEl shows 6 a sample 0 game with 4 these strategies where it can be seen that a spiral of defection quickly occurs.
TARI.E 2 ~ NON-fORGIVMO GAME
Extending the example, we will assume that strategies 4, 5 and 6 areforgiving strategies. Table 3 shows the feature values for the first move, threshold and forgiving?. We will assume the value for 1 (to calculate payoff-decrease?) is 4 and we will assume that the length of the cooperative gesture is 2. Table 4 shows the behaviour. At the fifth move, strategies 4, 5 and 6 begin to behave cooperatively (as they are forgiving strategies). This forgiveness is triggered by the decrease in payoffs obtained by these strategies (i.e. the payoff at move 1 is greater than the payoff obtained at move 4 for all three strategies).
This introduction of cooperative behaviour has a knock-on effect in that those strategies (whetherforgiving or not) with sufficiently low thresholds will now react cooperatively (e.g. in the example, strategies 2 and 3, each with a threshold of 3, play cooperatively on move 6 and strategy 1, with threshold 4, plays cooperatively on move 7). From then on, all strategies play cooperatively.
TABLE^ FORGNMGGAME
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we discuss and present experiments undertaken (and the corresponding results) with the classes of strategies discussed in Section 111. Three separate sets of experiments are undertaken: the first (A) involves the co-evolution of a family of nonforgiving strategies. This is used as a base case with which to compare the fitness of other societies of strategies. In the second experiment (B), which is used to show the benefit offorgiving strategies, we enforce forgiveness (setting the forgiving features) and allow evolution over other features. The third experiment (C) is designed to investigate the performance of a society in which strategies can evolve to be forgiving or not. We are more interested in the comparison between experiments A and C but experiment B provides an illustration of the benefit of forgiveness.
Parameters for all experiments are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
.
I .
A. In Fig. 1 shows the average degree of cooperation in a game. In the experiments with the non-forgiving strategies, a large proportion of strategies tend to periodically reach states of mutual cooperation h m states of mutual defection. If strategies were either all all-C (cooperating all the time) or all all-D (defecting continuously), this shift would not be expected without massively high mutation. However, in these experiments, where strategies have thresholds in the range 0-3 1, it is possible for cooperation to gain a foot-hold and spread through the population. This is due to the fact that, at any point in time, in any game, there may be a number of strategies willing to cooperate given only minor increases in the number of cooperators present. This minor increase may occur through mutation or crossover. This causes cooperation to flourish due to a "hock-on" effect caused by the threshold of more strategies being satisfied. A related factor is the potential drift in strategies' threshold values. In a state of mutual cooperation, there is little selective pressure exerted on strategies' thresholds which may cause thresholds to drift to low values, thereby increasing the probability of cooperation flourishing. (Conversely, threshold values may drift in the other direction making it difficult for cooperation to get a foothold).
It is interesting to note that large dips in cooperative behaviour exist, where the population changes dramatically from mutual cooperation to mutual defection. Given the co-evolutionary nature of the experiments, the fitness landscape is effectively changing. Once a certain trait becomes dominant in the population (cooperate on the first move, low thresholds, willingness to forgive), it becomes advantageous for a strategy to behave less cooperatively.
This may occur through the application of evolutionary operators to the strategies. Once this change is introduced to any strategy it will gain a foothold over the other strategies and these less 'cooperative' features spread quickly.
B. Experiment B
In this experiment, the following features were -First move Threshold The forgiving value is set to 1 for all strategies, and all associated forgiving parameters are set for each strategy. Considering the mean degree of cooperation over 20 experiments, we observe that the mean cooperation is vastly improved over that in experiment A. The mean number of cooperators per tum per game increases from 21.72 to 26.82. This difference is expected due to the enforced bias with respect to forgiveness.
C. Experiment C In experiment C, we hold constant the length and used: degree of forgiveness, but evolve whether strategies will forgive or not and how many times they will forgive in a game. We also evolve the fKst move and threshold for all strategies. The scatter plot in Fig. 2 shows a larger number of occunences of largely cooperative games. This increase is brought about by the existence of forgiving strategies and their ability to induce a higher degree of cooperative behaviour in the society. Fig. 3 shows box plots comparing mean average cooperation in Experiment A (no forgiving, the control) and Experiment C &-giving). There is strong evidence (p value<0.001) to suggest higher mean average cooperation for the forgiving population compared to the control population (95% confidence interval for me mean improvement 0.07 to 0.21). In summary, the population of strategies which may evolve to be forgiving achieves a significant improvement in average cooperation.
In experiment C we see the effect of the forgiving feature notable in the following way: the ability of cooperation to gain a foothold is more pronounced Mean CwopnHon per GensMon G..n.nuon The same "hock-on" effect exists as described earlier in Experiment A but forgiving will cause this "hock-on" effect to happen earlier and more frequently. For example, in states where a number of strategies are cooperative (i.e. on the first move), strategies may begin to defect (based on their threshold values). However, rather than a continued move to mutual defection, there is the potential that a number of forgiving strategies will play cooperatively based on identifying a decrease in their pay-offs and hence reverse the trend towards defection. We still see fluctuations between states of mutual cooperation and mutual defection (see Fig.  4) . Once a population is in a state of mutual cooperation' there is a selective pressure for strategies to defect and not forgive. This can then spread quickly in the population leading to states of mutual defection.
Once in states of mutual defection, genetic drift can create situations where cooperation is once again favoured. Fig. 5 depicts the number of forgiving strategies in the population over time. The graph is characterised by a number of peaks where the population are behaving in a forgiving manner. Once forgiving becomes a feature of the population, it can he exploited by the rest of the population by not forgiving and not cooperating on the first move. In any given generation, any strategy that exploits the other strategies by defecting will gain in fitness and hence be more likely to he selected. Hence strategies that cooperate on the first move or are forgiving will not spread. Once defection on the first move becomes the norm, no strategy will invoke forgiveness (as there is no decrease in payoffs). Via genetic drift, thresholds and the number offorgiving strategies change to create suitable conditions for cooperation to exist. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present results from experiments with classes of strategies and strategy features in the N-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In particular we explore the idea of incorporatingforgiveness as a strategy feature. A co-evolutionary methodology is used.
We show that the incorporation of forgiveness leads to higher levels of cooperation in this coevolutionary setting.
Future work will investigate more fully the interplay between the features of the strategies in a co-evolutionary setting and their effect in reestablishing cooperation. 
